Unlike the criminal law, tort law does not recognise insanity as an answer to liability. The fact that a defendant was insane at the time of his impugned conduct is essentially ignored by tort law's liability rules. It will be argued that this situation is unsatisfactory. A person should not incur liability in tort in respect of acts committed while insane. This result should be realised by providing for a generally applicable affirmative defence of insanity.
Introduction
All of the major common law jurisdictions withhold insanity as an answer to liability in tort. The satisfactoriness of this situation has been extensively discussed by theorists. Some contend that tort law should fall into line with the criminal law and that insane defendants should be released from liability. 1 Others argue that insanity on the part of the defendant should be disregarded in so far as liability is concerned. As has just been mentioned, the case law and literature on the relevance of the defendant's insanity in tort law often ignores the difference between absent element defences and affirmative defences. It is uncommon for insanity to be discussed without the reader being left in the dark as to whether the writer is talking about insanity qua absent element defence, insanity qua affirmative defence or insanity generally. However, there is a need for clarity on this point for at least two reasons.
First, a failure to distinguish between the different types of defences is likely to 7 This label is borrowed from Paul H Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 12. 8 More specifically, an absent element defence is (1) a denial of the truth of the claimant's allegations or (2) a denial of the legal sufficiency of the claimant's allegations (i.e. a denial that the claimant's allegations, even if true, show that a tort was committed). While (1) and (2) are clearly distinct (in the old system of pleading (1) was made by traversing the allegations while (2) was made by a demurrer), the difference between them does not matter for present purposes. Accordingly, both (1) and (2) will be counted as absent element defences.
contaminate the analysis as to whether insane persons should be exempted from liability. It may, for example, result in one mistaking an argument that only militates against insanity being admitted as an absent element defence for a consideration that counsels against exonerating the insane from liability generally. Secondly, unless one is alive to the distinction between absent element defences and affirmative defences, one cannot fully appreciate how a defence of insanity (if admitted) would operate. For instance, were insanity an answer to liability, the way in which it is cast would affect the allocation of the burden of pleading and proof in respect of it.
The Descriptive Issue
This Part describes the effect of insanity on the part of the defendant on liability in tort.
A. Insanity can Function Indirectly as an Absent Element Defence
No tort contains an element that is specifically concerned with whether the defendant was of sound mind at the time at which he engaged in his impugned conduct. In other words, sanity on the part of the defendant is not a component of any tort. It follows that insanity per se is not an absent element defence. Nevertheless, some torts incorporate elements that may be indirectly negated by insanity. For instance, if the claimant alleges that the defendant committed the tort of deceit, the fact that the defendant was insane at the relevant time may lead the court to conclude that he did not intend to defraud the claimant. 9 Similarly, if the claimant was insane when he 9 Becker v Becker 138 NYS 2d 397 (Sup Ct 1954).
engaged in his impugned conduct, the court may be prompted to hold that he did not act voluntarily. This happened in Breunig v American Family Insurance Co. 10 The defendant motorist in this case steered her vehicle on to the wrong side of the road and accelerated. She drove in this manner because she believed that God was controlling her car and that she could 'fly like Batman'. She was surprised when she did not become airborne and, instead, collided with the claimant's oncoming vehicle.
The court found that the defendant's insanity rendered her conduct involuntary. 11 The claimant failed in his bid to recover damages as a result. Some elements of certain torts are insensitive to insanity on the part of the defendant. The most noteworthy of these elements is the breach element of the tort of negligence. The breach element cannot be undercut by the fact that a defendant was insane at the time of his conduct in question. This is because the standard of the reasonable person excludes mental illnesses suffered by the defendant from consideration. The Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 11(c), provides: '[a]n actor's mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent'. Insanity of the claimant is treated differently for the purposes of contributory negligence: see below n 38. A case that might be thought to be inconsistent with the proposition that mental illnesses suffered by the defendant are not attributed to the reasonable person is Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (CA). In this matter, the defendant truck driver failed to control his vehicle. As a result, it ran off of the road and into the claimants' shop. The accident occurred because the defendant suffered from a malignant tumor in his pancreas. This tumor meant that excessive insulin was secreted which in turn casued the amount of glucose in his blood to fall to such a point that his brain did not function properly. The defendant was unaware his severely reduced level of consciousness. The Court of Appeal held that he should be judged against the standard of care that would have been achieved by "a reasonably competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to drive' (at 1268). It is submitted that this holding does not establish that mental illnesses under which the defendant labours may be attributed to the reasonable person. This is because the defendant in this case did not suffer from a mental illness. His disease was a physical one. Even if the defendant had suffered from a mental illness, it is doubtful that Mansfield should be accepted as good authority for the proposition that the reasonable person may be imputed with mental illnesses under which the defendant was labouring. English law has firmly rejected the suggestion that the standard of the reasonable person should be adjusted on account of the idiosyncraties of the defendant.
B. Insanity is not an Affirmative Defence
It is well established in all of the major common law jurisdictions that insanity is not an affirmative defence to any tort. 13 Consider the following cases:
(1 one who commits a tort cannot escape from liability on the basis that he was insane at the time.
C. Summary
In this Part, the following important features of the relevant law were noted:
(1) Insanity is not, strictly speaking, an absent element defence to liability in tort. This is because no tort includes sanity as one of its elements.
(2) Nevertheless, insanity can occasionally function as an absent element defence indirectly. The fact that the defendant was insane at the relevant time can undercut some elements of certain torts (e.g. the fraud element of the action in deceit).
(3) The breach element of the tort of negligence is not one of these elements. This is because the fact that the defendant was insane at the material time is not taken into account in determining the standard of care. The standard is impersonal in this respect.
(4) Insanity is not an affirmative defence to any tort.
Due to these rules, a defendant generally cannot avoid incurring liability in tort on the ground that he was insane when he engaged in his impugned behaviour.
The Prescriptive Issue: The Case Against a Defence of Insanity
This Part and the next consider whether insanity should prevent liability in tort from arising. It is convenient to begin by examining the arguments for maintaining the status quo. Two points need to be made in clarification of the way in which the analysis will proceed. First, we are not focusing on any tort in particular. The argument is addressed to tort law generally. Secondly, the issue that is under consideration here is whether insanity on the part of the defendant should prevent liability from arising simpliciter. We are not at present concerned with whether, in the event that insanity should exculpate, tort law should recognise an absent element defence of sanity or an affirmative defence of insanity. 24 Accordingly, in this Part and in Part 5, the word 'defence' is used to encompass both absent element defences and affirmative defences except where the difference between the two types of defences is important.
A. The Causation Argument
Suppose that D, who is insane, causes C loss. This argument is unpersuasive. The key problem with it is that it ignores the fact that part of the reason why strict liability is imposed for harm resulting from abnormally dangerous activities is that, typically, those who cause harm while engaged in such activities will be at fault. The levying of strict liability saves the effort and expense of inquiring as to fault when fault will normally be present. Clearly, though, a person who causes damage while insane will rarely be to blame. course of their employment. For the sake of argument, assume that it is justifiable to impose strict liability on those who are good loss bearers/distributors. Is levying strict liability on insane persons thereby warranted? Obviously it is not. The insane are unlikely to have deep pockets (particularly if they are institutionalised). On the contrary, they will typically be hard up.
Is there any other theory by which holding the insane strictly liable can be justified? An important general defence of strict liability was offered by Tony Honoré in his well known essay 'Responsibility and Luck'. 29 Honoré argues that since we take the benefit of good luck when we do not deserve it, it is fair for us to be burdened with responsibility for the bad consequences of our acts even if we were not at fault in bringing them about. It is just, he says, because, over the long run, people tend to come out in front in the sense that they will have more credits from good outcomes than debits from bad ones. Does this logic support holding the insane strictly liable? It does not. This is because it is unlikely that the insane will be winners overall. This was noted by Honoré. He said that it is only fair to impose liability on persons who are not at fault if they 'possess a minimum capacity for reasoned choice and action.'
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It would be possible to continue exploring grounds on which the imposition of strict liability generally has been defended. But it should be apparent from what has already been said that doing so is unlikely to uncover an argument that will support holding the insane strictly liable. Accordingly, we will leave matters here and conclude that, unless a compelling reason is identified for imposing strict liability on insane persons, the causation argument is unconvincing. As it stands, it is merely a question-begging statement.
29 Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) ch 2. 30 Ibid 26.
B. The Fraud Argument
It has been argued that insanity should not be a defence since, were it an answer to liability, sane defendants might invoke it. 31 Built into this argument is an assumption that it would be hard to identify defendants who succumb to this temptation. This logic (I will refer to it as the 'fraud argument') has been criticised on the ground that defendants would be unlikely to concoct a defence of insanity since being found insane carries a serious and indelible stigma, the possibility of civil commitment and the risk of suffering various civil disabilities, such as the loss of the right to practise one's profession. Critics of this argument have also observed that since most defendants are insured, there would be little incentive for them to plead insanity were insanity as answer to liability. One theorist sums up this line of reasoning as follows:
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A label of mental illness … carries with it a substantial stigma in our society. While some criminal defendants may be willing to assume the stigmatizing effect of such a label in order to escape … lengthy imprisonment, it does not necessarily follow that tort defendants would be willing when money damages are the only penalty at issue. The fact that many tort defendants are substantially insured to cover the cost of an adverse judgment further mitigates the concern about false claims and mental disability.
Proponents of the fraud argument and the critics of it have both overlooked a breathtakingly obvious point. Due to the ubiquity of insurance, it is not defendants but their insurers who normally invoke defences. Insured defendants typically have no say as to the defences that will or will not be raised on their behalf. Insurers do not even usually notify or consult with defendants as to how they will proceed in this respect.
Consequently, were insanity a defence, defendants would not often have the opportunity to plead it fraudulently. The fraud argument is therefore meritless. It also follows that the critics' observation that there would be many disincentives for defendants to contest their sanity were insanity a defence (although surely accurate 33 )
is neither here nor there.
Advocates of the fraud argument could reformulate it to accommodate the fact that it is insurers who get to decide whether to raise a defence. So restructured, this rationale for holding the insane liable is that insanity should not be a defence since,
were it an escape route from liability, insurers may dishonestly rely on it. Insurers, unlike defendants, have nothing to lose and everything to gain from succeeding on a defence of insanity and so have an incentive to rely on it fraudulently. But the fraud argument surely cannot be rescued in this way. It is simply improbable that many insurers would fraudulently enter a plea of insanity were insanity a defence. This is partly because they could not entertain any realistic hope of succeeding in any such subterfuge without colluding with the defendant and, for the reasons that have just been mentioned, few defendants will want to contest their sanity.
In addition to the foregoing, there are several other shortcomings in the fraud argument. These problems include the following: (1) It is incompatible with the assumption that the courts are generally thought to be capable of identifying mendacity. 40 Special measures have been put in place in the criminal context to ensure that only those defendants who were insane at the time of the offence succeed on an insanity defence. For instance, s 1 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (UK) requires evidence of two medical practitioners, at least one of whom is an experienced psychiatrist, before a defendant may be acquitted on the grounds of insanity. The fear of false insanity defences also probably underpins to some extent the fact that, in derogation of the presumption of innocence, the defendant bears the onus of proving insanity. 41 54 Bohlen wrote ((n 1) 37 n 38): It seems unworthy of the law, whose purpose should be to do justice and to perfect its machinery so that justice may be done, to deny immunity to persons so insane as to be incapable of culpability because of the difficulty of evolving a test satisfactory alike to lawyer and alienist by which the precise degree of mental deficiency which precludes culpability may be determined. 55 The prospect of administrative difficulties was often cited in the past in support of the historical refusal of the law to entertain actions in respect of negligently inflicted psychiatric injury. This argument was exposed as fallacious in this context too. Tort law is a tabula rasa in this respect. The test for insanity that is thought to best fit its agenda could be embraced.
D. The Unsatisfactory Evidence Argument
The rule that insanity is not an answer to liability has been defended on the basis of '[t]he unsatisfactory character of the evidence of mental deficiency in many cases.' 68 This logic, although deployed in many different contexts, 69 is utterly without merit. 70 It cannot explain why evidence of insanity is relevant to various other issues inside tort law 71 and in numerous other legal contexts. 72 In particular, it does not establish why an affirmative defence of insanity should be withheld. This is because, even if evidence of insanity is typically 'unsatisfactory', no problem would arise were insanity an affirmative defence since it would fail when the evidence is deficient (because the defendant would not discharge his burden of proof).
E. The Deterrence Argument
It has been argued that withholding a defence of insanity encourages insane actors to implement measures to ensure that, as a consequence of their insanity, they do not injure others. [Bentham] sets out to prove that to punish the mad … must be inefficacious; but all that he proves (at the most) is the quite different proposition that the threat of punishment will be ineffective so far as the class of persons who suffer from [madness] is concerned. Plainly it is possible that though (as Bentham says) the threat of punishment could not have operated on them, the actual infliction of punishment on those persons, may secure a higher measure of liability might incentivise others to behave in a way that reduces the rate at which wrongs are committed. Put differently, while imposing liability on the insane cannot be supported on the ground of specific deterrence, it may be defensible on the basis of general deterrence. Interestingly, tort lawyers were much faster than their criminal law colleagues to realise that this might be the case. It has often been contended that holding the insane accountable for their torts induces their guardians, carers and family members (I will refer to such individuals collectively as 'guardians' for convenience) to take proper care of them since they may have an interest in their estate and would not wish to see it depleted through damages awards. One court expressed this idea as follows:
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If an insane person is not held liable for his torts, those interested in his estate, as relatives, or otherwise, might not have a sufficient motive to so take care of him as to deprive him of opportunities for inflicting injuries upon others. There is more injustice in denying to the injured party the recovery of damages for the wrong suffered by him, than there is in calling upon the relatives or friends of the lunatic to pay the expense of his confinement, if he has an estate ample enough for that purpose. The liability of lunatics for their torts tends to secure a more efficient custody and guardianship of their persons.
It is possible that holding the insane liable might prompt their guardians to act in such a way as will reduce the rate at which they injure others. is from the individual held liable, the less likely it is that imposing liability will have the desired deterrent effect.
F. The Avoidance and Deinstitutionalisation Arguments
There are two closely related but subtly different arguments to the effect that insanity
should not be a tort defence since, were it an answer to liability, it would have deleterious consequences for insane persons. We will call these arguments the 'avoidance argument' and the 'deinstitutionalisation argument'. The gist of the avoidance argument is that tort law should not recognise a plea of insanity since admitting insanity as a defence would discourage interaction with insane persons.
George Alexander and Thomas Szasz put this contention as follows: This argument is unpersuasive. The central defect in it is that the analogy between contract and tort is a false one. People can, generally speaking, select carefully those with whom they contract. Consequently, they may, as Alexander and Szasz point out, avoid contracting with individuals who might have a defence to liability for breach of contract. However, it is not very possible to limit the people with whom one interacts 83 Alexander and Szasz (n 2) 36.
to those from whom one might be able to recover damages in tort law in the event that one is injured by them. This is because, very often, the victims of torts and tortfeasors are strangers.
The thrust of the deinstitutionalisation argument is that insanity should not be a defence since exempting the insane from liability might increase opposition to the policy of deinstitutionalisation. 84 This logic is embraced in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. The Reporters claim that deinstitutionalisation 'becomes more socially acceptable if innocent victims are at least assured of opportunity for compensation when they suffer injury' at the hands of those who would escape from liability. to the policy of deinstitutionalisation. But this is not a convincing reason for holding the insane liable for their torts. This is because the inflammatory effect of exonerating insane defendants from tort liability would surely generally pale in comparison to the public hostility to the policy of deinstitutionalisation that is aroused by letting such defendants out of criminal liability 87 Furthermore, tort law is unlikely to be an efficacious tool for bolstering the policy of deinstitutionalisation. It would be much more sensible to advance this policy through educational and other modalities.
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In conclusion, the avoidance and deinstitutionalisation arguments are unpersuasive.
There are two further criticisms that can be made against them jointly. First, neither of them demonstrates that the suggested deleterious consequences of recognising a defence of insanity for the mentally disordered are worth tolerating. They myopically centre on the downsides for the insane of providing them with a defence without considering the potential benefits. Secondly, several civil law jurisdictions admit insanity as a defence to delictual liability 89 but the feared consequences predicted by these arguments do not seem to have materialised. 87 It is abundantly clear that the public is ardently opposed to the insanity defence in the criminal sphere. It is widely perceived to be a loophole that is frequently exploited. The proposition that tort liability is a sanction cannot be refuted on the ground that one can insure against liability to pay damages in tort. There are at least two reasons why this is the case. First, rejecting the proposition concerned on this basis would be to overlook the fact that contracts of insurance in respect of liability to pay punitive damages, the sole or dominant purpose of which is to punish the defendant, are not contrary to public policy: see Lamb v Cotogno (1987) [83] . The second reason is that one who rejects the proposition in question on this ground would be committed to the untenable claim that, were it possible to insure against criminal sanctions, criminal liability would cease to be a sanction.
H. The Self-Support Argument
Another argument in favour of liability is the 'self-support argument'. One court expressed it as follows:
94 'that as an insane person must pay for his support, if he is financially able, so he ought also to pay for the damage which he does'. This argument does not work. It is not a corollary of an ability to pay for one's necessaries [caused by insane persons], and we might have the anomaly of an insane person having abundant wealth depriving another of his rights without compensation'.
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This argument is afflicted by serious confusion. The main problem with it is that it assumes that tort law is concerned to ameliorate unjust distributions of financial wealth. This is not the case. On the contrary, it can aggravate such distributive injustices. Grindingly poor defendants who commit torts against the obscenely wealthy are liable to compensate the latter for their losses. In any event, the spectre that this argument raises is all but non-existent. There is virtually no prospect of extreme distributive injustices of monetary assets resulting by virtue of the creation of an insanity defence since, as has been stressed several times, the insane will usually not be possessed of substantial means.
J. The Justified Expectations Argument
According to Patrick Keeley, a defendant's insanity should not provide him with a defence in so far as letting him out of liability would frustrate the claimant's reasonable expectations that the defendant would comply with safety conventions. herself threatened by that condition, and after acquiring that knowledge failed to act with ordinary care or voluntarily remained subject to that danger, she should not be able to recover even though defendant [sic] breached a safety convention.
There are several oddities lurking in this argument. Kelley states that a claimant who is injured by a mentally ill defendant should be denied compensation if he knew that the defendant was mentally ill but failed to take reasonable care for his own safety. But why should this be the case? Ordinarily, a failure by the claimant to take reasonable care for his interests results in apportionment rather than a verdict for the defendant. Furthermore, does Kelley believe that liability should be imposed whenever the claimant's justified expectations that the defendant would comply with a safety convention would be dashed were redress unavailable? Does he believe, for instance, that an occupier from whose property a dangerous object escapes due to an act of God should be held liable for the ensuing damage if others reasonably expected that the object would be kept under control? Does he think that damage caused by a person's unexpected involuntary bodily movements should be compensable? If he does, his vision of tort law is radically different from the way it exists at present.
Finally, this argument focuses on the claimant but leaves this focus unexplained. Why should the attention be on the claimant's reasonable expectations rather than on the fairness of holding insane defendants liable?
K. The Price Paid for Membership of Society Argument
One of the more specious arguments in support of liability is that the insane should pay for the damage that they cause in return for being permitted to live among the general population. 
M. The Resistance and Asset Recovery Argument
Imagine the following scenarios:
(1) C1, a businessman, is walking to work. D1, who is insane, lunges for C1's briefcase.
(2) D2, who is insane, breaks into C2's house and absconds with C2's computer.
Were insanity a defence, would it be permissible for C1 to resist D1 
The Prescriptive Issue: The Case in Favour of a Defence of Insanity
In the previous Part, arguments upholding the rule that insanity is not a defence were considered. They were all found wanting. Indeed, most are so breathtakingly weak that it is surprising that they continue to enjoy support. In this Part, the case in favour of recognising a defence of insanity will be sketched. Since the opposing arguments have been moved out of the way, this can, fortunately, be done within a short compass.
A. The Free Will Paradigm Argument
Like the criminal law, tort law is premised on the concept of free will; the idea that human beings are self-determining agents. 103 This notion finds expression in many of tort law's most basic principles. It will suffice to mention two (these examples could easily be multiplied). Take, first, the rule that involuntary acts do not attract liability.
A person who strikes another individual due to an uncontrolled muscular reflex, or because he was attacked by a swarm of bees, 104 or because he suffered from a law, in failing to grant a defence of insanity, does not adhere faithfully to the paradigm of free will. In order to be consistent, it must, like the criminal law, release insane persons from liability.
B. The Sanction Argument
Another reason for exempting insane persons from liability was gestured towards earlier when we considered the 'purpose of tort law argument'. 108 This argument, recall, draws a sharp contrast between tort law and the criminal law, identifying the former with compensation and the latter with punishment, and holds that, by reason of their different purposes, these bodies of law properly diverge in their treatment of insane defendants. It was contended that this view of the tort/crime divide is much too simple. This is mainly because it fails to acknowledge that tort liability, like criminal liability, is a sanction. That tort liability should be identified as a sanction is beyond serious dispute. 109 Tort liability is not akin, for instance, to a tax. It is designed to express, among other things, disapproval of substandard conduct. It is true that, generally speaking, tort liability is not as censorious as criminal liability. But it is a sanction nonetheless. Once this is accepted, the conclusion that it is unfair to hold insane defendants liable in tort becomes irresistible. 110 Just as it would be a travesty to impose criminal liability on insane persons, it is unjust to visit them with tort liability.
The Characterisation Issue
The insane should not be held liable in tort law. How should this result be realised?
There are two options. First, insanity could operate as an absent element defence.
Secondly, an affirmative defence of insanity could be recognised. It is submitted that the case for casting insanity as an affirmative defence is overwhelming. In the first place, the criminal law treats insanity as an affirmative defence. Why should tort law proceed differently? A second reason has to do with the fact that the burden of proof is allocated by reference to the distinction between absent element defences and affirmative defences. Were tort law to introduce sanity as an element of each tort, it would be for the claimant to prove that the defendant was of sound mind in every case. This would be unfair since the defendant will invariably have better access to evidence on this point. It would also involve a very considerable waste of scarce court resources since, in the vast majority of cases, there will be no doubt as to the defendant's sanity. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, construing insanity as an absent element defence would mean that tort law would only speak to those who are of sound mind; only those of sound mind would be required to refrain from engaging in certain acts. This would be undesirable. It would be more respectful of the mentally ill to characterise insanity as an affirmative defence. Doing so would address them as subjects of tort law.
Implications of Recognising Insanity as an Answer to Liability
The birth of an affirmative defence of insanity may have ramifications for other parts of tort law. For example, it would seem to have implications for the way in which tort defendant's insanity is imputed to the reasonable person, the court would be required to ask how the reasonable insane person would have acted in the circumstances. This is an absurd question since the notion of a reasonable insane person is oxymoronic.
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This is, therefore, a factor that weighs against imputing the reasonable person with mental illnesses suffered by the defendant. Importantly, however, it has no bearing whatsoever on the issue of whether insanity should be an affirmative defence.
Conclusion
The general position throughout the common law world is that liability in tort cannot be avoided on the grounds of insanity. This article has examined the reasons that have been offered in support of this rule. None of them is capable of sustaining it. Two arguments were, however, identified in favour of letting insane defendants out of liability. The gist of the first argument is that tort law should admit insanity as a defence because doing so is called for by its acceptance of the paradigm of free will.
The thrust of the second is that tort liability is a sanction and that it is therefore unjust to impose it on insane defendants. Insanity should constitute an affirmative defence rather than an absent element defence. This is principally because taking insanity into account via an absent element defence would demean insane persons: it would mean that tort law would not address them. The admission of insanity as an affirmative defence would have various implications for the rest of tort law. Most notably, it would call for the recognition of a defence of infancy.
